The privilege against self-incrimination has been regarded, since early in English history, as an essential safeguard against unfounded and tyrannical prosecution.' During its development in England and America, there was much experimentation with.granting immunity instead of permitting an unbridled exercise of *" § 3486. Compelled testimony tending to incriminate witnesses; immunity (a) In the course of any investigation relating to any interference with or endangering of, or any plans or attempts to interfere with or endanger the national security or defense of the United States by treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy or the overthrow of its Government by force or violence, no witness shall be excused from testifying or from producing books, papers, or other evidence before either House, or before any committee of either House, or before any joint committee of the two Houses of Congress on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, when the record shows that-(1) in the case of proceedings before one of the Houses of Congress, that a majority of the members present of that House; or (2) in the case of proceedings before a committee, that two-thirds of the members of the full committee shall by affirmative vote have authorized such witness to be granted immunity under this section with respect to the transactions, matters, or things concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination to testify or produce evidence by direction of the presiding officer; and that an order of the United States district a claim asserting the privilege. 2 In 1857 Congress passed the first federal immunity act. 3 However, the 1857 Act was phrased so loosely that the witness could voluntarily disclose unresponsive self-incriminating testimony and thus gain an "immunity bath," that is, immunity from prosecution for all offenses discourt for the district wherein the inquiry is being carried on has been entered into the record requiring said person to testify or produce evidence. Such an order may be issued by a United States district court judge upon application by a duly authorized representative of the Congress or of the committee concerned. But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning-which he is so compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding (except prosecutions described in subsection (d) hereof) against him in any court. (b) Neither House nor any committee thereof nor any joint committee of the two Houses of Congress shall grant immunity to any witness without first having notified the Attorney General of the United Statps of such action and thereafter having secured the approval of the United States district court for the district wherein such inquiry is being held. The Attorney General of the United States shall be notified of the time of each proposed application to the United States district court and shall be given the opportunity to be heard with respect thereto prior to the entrance into the record of the order of the district court. (28), (29) or 241(a) (6), (7) or 313(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (204) (205) (206) (240) (241) , and conspiracies involving any of the foregoing, is necessary to the public interest, he, upon the approval of the Attorney General, shall make application to the court that the witness shall be instructed to testify or produce evidence subject to the provisions of this section, and upon order of the court such witness shall not be excused from testifying or from producing books, papers, or other evidence on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding (except prosecution desribed in subsection (d) hereof) against him in any court.
(d) No witness shall be exempt under the provision of this section from prosecution for perjury or contempt committed while giving testimony or producing evidence under compulsion as provided in this section. As amended Aug. 20, 1954, c . 769, S 1, 68 Stat. 745." 18 U. S. C. § 3486 (Supp. 1954) .
1 The English Parliament never thought it necessary to pass an act providing for the privilege against self-incrimination since it was so well established. The privilege concept was carried to America Counselman v. Hiccock, 6 section 860, which was the court and grand jury section of this revised Act, was held invalid because the immunity provided by it was not coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination which the witness was required to surrender 
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an immunity provision incorporated into the Interstate Commerce Commission legislation in 1893. This provision granted absolute immunity from prosecution in the federal courts. Subsequently, immunity clauses were incorporated in many temporary wartime measures and in virtually" all of the major regulatory enactments of the federal government.1 Furthermore, a majority of the states have enacted immunity legislation.' 0 Although the Counselman decision had held the grand jury and court section of the 1868 Act invalid, there remained in force its companion provision, which permitted congressional committees to extend a grant of immunity to witnesses appearing before them." However, Congress became increasingly disturbed as suspected subversives and criminals refused to testify before congressional com-' This statute, the Act of Feb. 11, 1893, c. 83, 27 STwr. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1953), was held constitutional in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) since it provided the equivalent of the constitutional privilege. The procedure followed under the Interstate Commerce Commission Act involved in the Brown case was more strict than that followed under the 1857 Act which allowed immunity baths. In the proceedings leading up to the Brown case the witness was required to claim his privilege before a court order was issued granting him immunity for matters disclosed in answers to specific questions. Immunity was then to be granted only for matters specified in the court order so that if the witness volunteered incriminating testimony he thereby waived his privilege for such voluntary information. In the Emspaock case Justice Harlan decried the Supreme Court's apparent retreat from Learned Hand's test of when the privilege can be properly invoked. According to this test, the witness to have a proper basis for his claim must face the risk of exposing himself to a real and appreciable danger as while testifying before either Congress or a congressional committee there may be a grant of immunity authorized upon a majority vote of the entire legislative body or by a two-thirds vote of the committee respectively. Then, a duly authorized representative of the body concerned applies to the district court for an order compelling the desired testimony or papers. Such order compelling testimony may be issited by a United States district court judge. Section (b) provides that the Attorney General of the United States must first be notified and given an opportunity to be heard by the court before approval by the district court. Section (c), which pertains to grand jury investigations and court trials, also requires a witness to claim his privilege against self-incrimination. ' If the United States Attorney who is handling the case, believes it necessary to the public interest that a witness be compelled to testify, he must seek the approval of the Attorney General. If the latter approves, application is then made to the district court to issue an order instructing the witness to testify or produce the required evidence.
6
Proceedings under the Compulsory Testimony Act may raise many problems such as whether the adverse party requirement of a case or controversy is fulfilled; whether there is a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and whether Congress has the power to prevent any prosecution by the states for crimes disclosed in federally compelled testimony.
These problems were considered in the first case to be decided under the 1954 Act, opposed to a remote and unlikely possibility of selfincrimination. Weisman v. United States, 111 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1940). Will, as the majority decision in the Emtspack case seems to indicate, a different standard be applied under § § (a) and (b) proceedings than under (c)?
15 See note 15 supra. 16 Section (d) provides that under this statute the witness is still subject to prosecution for perjury or contempt committed while giving compelled testimony.
It re Ullman. 17 The case arose when Ullman refused to testify before a grand jury, claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege. The United States Attorney requested an order granting him immunity which was issued by the federal district court; but upon Ullman's continued refusal to testify he was sentenced to six months for contempt of court.
In the district court, Ullman alleged a lack of adverse parties. This problem may arise if the witness wishes immunity and thus has interests which coincide with those of the interrogator. 8 However, since a witness must first claim his privilege of refusing to testify before immunity can be granted, it seems apparent that the court which issues the order compelling testimony is confronted with at least two adverse parties, the witness and the Attorney General. 
S. 951 (1955).
The court held, inter alia, that the immunity provided by the statute is coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination and is, therefore an adequate substitute for it. In answer to Ullman's objection that the request of such information violated his First Amendment rights, the court held that the investigation did not relate to his political belief and affiliation. In addition, the court also held that the questions appeared to come within the framework of an inquiry into national defense or security, hence the witness had no basis for urging that the questions were incompetent and immaterial. As to the latter proposition, see 19 Even though the witness may want immunity from prosecution for a crime about which he may be "compelled" to testify, it is evident in a claim of the privilege that the witness would prefer to remain silent instead of being granted immunity in exchange for his testimony. The opposing argument is that the witness, although desirous of immunity, is forced to (Vol. 46 jury section [ §c] of the Act, the court in the Ullman case held that the witness could raise all legal or constitutional objections against immunity-thus providing the necessary adverse parties. 1 Discounting the witness as a possible adverse party under a section (a) and (b) proceeding there is still the possibility of finding two adverse parties. These sections are designed to allow Congress and the courts to weigh the effect of information relating to prospective witnesses which is ordinarily available only to the Attorney General.n The Attorney General would serve as a check on Congress which might, in ignorance of other investigations and pending prosecutions, unwisely wish to grant immunity.2 It is also possible that during investigations of the executive department Congress may point up activities, a disclosure of which the Attorney General might improperly wish to suppress.u Thus, in the go through the formality of claiming his privilege, thereby precluding classifying him as an adverse party.
"This of course is a different means of arriving at an adverse party situation, and by this the technical problems considered in note "19 supra are avoided.
n As chief legal officerof the United States Government the Attorney General would know of pending prosecutions that might be disrupted by a judicially sanctioned Congressional grant of immunity. congressional section as well as in the court and grand -jury section there is the possibility of finding two adverse parties. Another problem arising is whether Congress has conferred upon the courts a non-judicial power, thereby violating the doctrine of separation of powers. According to a statement in the Ullman case, the court may be required to exercise a non-judicial discretion under sections (a) and (b) of the Act, distinguishing it from the judicial function performed under section (c).m In that case the court deemed significant the language in sections (a) and (b) which requires the Congress to notify the Attorney General and secure the approval of the district court before granting immunity and which provides that the order may be issuted by the district court judge. 25 According to the court, the district judge would participate in balancing the possibility and advisability of prosecuting the individual against the need for particular information to see whether the public interest may best be served by granting immunity. If the district court does have the final decision of what is in the public interest 21 128 F.Supp. at 625. The district court opinion set up the following prerequisite conditions to be checked by the court before ordering the witness to testify under a section (c) proceeding: (1) the proceeding must relate to national security and defense; (2) the United States Attorney and the Attorney General must have approved the application; (3) no other legal objection exists to the compulsion of the witness's testimony. A legal objection would be that the witness had not properly claimed his privilege. See note 15 supra. 25 128 F. Supp. at 625.
1A
test suggested by the A.B.A. to determine whether immunity should be granted is as follows: "Is the evidence expectable from this witness so important to this proceeding, and is this proceeding so important, that the witness should now be compelled to give his evidence and so be immunized, in spite of the offense for which he may go unpunished and in spite of the damage his immunity may do t6 present or future efforts to enforce the criminal laws of this state or to the public interest in a just, under sections (a) and (b) then there is the possibility of an improper merger of judicial, executive, and legislative functions."
However, the process of balancing the need for testimony against the desirability of prosecution seems not altogether different from the judicial balancing of competing considerations in other areas of judicial activity. Throughout many of the states it is found that analogous duties are performed by judges.'s For instance the courts may consider applications for the recount of votes following an election.
2 ' In addition, Congress delegates the power to federal courts to exercise their discretion in imposing prison terms within specified limits, 23 and to suspend sentences and place convicted persons on probation.
3
' In probation matters the judicial discretion is necessarily broad since the punishment must be tailored to the individual defendant. Likewise, in the present situation the order must be tailored to the individual witness being interrogated. In both, the public interest and the interest of the individual are under consideration by the judge.? The preceding " Traditionally policy decisions rest either with the executive or legislative branches of government since they, unlike the judiciary, are directly responsible to the electorate. See BA.DWIN, Tax AmERicAN
JUDICARY (1905).
29 These include the appointment of city park commissioners, water commissioner, morgue keepers, commissioners to survey the boundary between municipalities, and persons to examine sick, maimed, or disabled animals. VANDERBILT, THE DocTrrNE n Courts also balance competing considerations in other areas. Courts will decide if a strike would imperil the national health or safety when required examples illustrate that in many situations there may be a very broad interpretation as to what constitutes a proper judicial function. In this instance the delegation of a certain amount of discretion recognizes that additional security may be afforded a witness by vesting the final determination, as to whether or not immunity should be granted, in the hands of the judiciary. Furthermore, the public interest would best be served by allowing the three branches of government to serve as checks on one another -in this area. However, if it is determined that non-judicial discretion does lie with the court under sections (a) and (b), then the Supreme Court may declare these sections unconstitutional while permitting the court and grand jury section [ §c] to stand.-Seemingly the most important problem of practical significance raised by the Act is whether Congress. has the power to prevent subsequent state prosecutions for crimes disdosed in federally compelled testimonyU An understanding of some basic principles is necessary to properly focus this issue. In United to do so by the emergency strike provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947) not to derivatively obtained evidenceJ? The rationale underlying the Adams decision is that a statute barring use of testimony elicited by the federal government is a legitimate exercise of the congressional power "necessary and proper" to carry out its legislative function and is binding upon the states as "the supreme law of the land."
40 Supported by the above proposition, the apparent purpose of Congress in passing this statute is to advance beyond the Adams decision and ban subsequent state prosecution." Since Congress has the power to prohibit the use in state courts of evidence elicited before congressional committees, there appears to be no valid reason why it should not have the power to bar any subsequent prosecution concerning matters disclosed in testimony elicited before a federal grand jury or other federal body."
In matters of national concern, such as national defense and security, to which the present Act relates, Congress may pass laws superseding state legislation on the same subject. An example of this is the supersedure n347 U.S. at 181. 4 0 Congress may pass laws "necessary and proper" to carry out legislative functions vested in it by Article I. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 18 
